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This paper investigates the beneficial economic consequences and market and accounting based
valuation effects of troubled debt restructurings (TDRs) in financially distressed debtor firms.
Relying on the implications of prior research and extant valuation theories, some empirical
evidence on the beneficial outcomes and informativeness of TDR is first provided: significantly
positive restructuring interval excess returns and higher excess returns to subsequently con-
summated restructurings and subsequent survivors. The market reaction to “full-settlement”
and “modification of terms” types of TDR are also measured to evaluate the consistency of the
FASB’s binary classification and recognition criteria with the market participants’ assessments.
Finally, a valuation model conditional on book values and earnings is used to test the value
relevance of the reported financial statement bottom lines and TDR related disclosure. The
findings suggest that modifications are at least as beneficial and informative as full settlements.
Hence, the recognition of the reduction in the liability and the related gain in the financial
statements of firms that undertake modifications would be more congruent with the valuation
effects assessed by market participants.
Keywords : Private workouts; financial distress; debt restructuring; valuation; capital markets;
SFAS No. 15.
1. Introduction
The Asian and the Russian economic crises fol-
lowed by indications of a global slump as evi-
denced by the Enron, Tyco, Swissair, Sabena
insolvencies on each side of the Atlantic have
led to a debate on how to handle such failures:
whether to bail them out by restructuring their
debt or let them fail, as a lesson to over-zealous
investors.1 Such troubled debt restructurings
(TDRs) have been acknowledged as viable, less
costly alternatives to legal Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations (see, e.g. Brown et al., 1993; Di Napoli
et al., 1991; Franks and Torous, 1994; Gilson
et al., 1990; Hamer, 1985). Furthermore, firms
that announce their TDR intentions have dif-
ferent financial profiles than similar non-TDR
firms (Aksu, 1994) and firms that have success-
fully consummated their restructurings exhibit
different financial characteristics than bankrupt
firms and unsuccessful TDR firms (Gilson et al.,
1990; Hamer, 1985). Finally, prior market-based
research has found that they exhibit different
return patterns around the announcement of
their TDR attempts (see, e.g. Aksu, 2001; Gilson
et al., 1990). These findings imply that different
stages and remedies for financial distress might
have different valuation effects.
1See “Handle with care,” The Economist, 3–9 October 1998 and “Fixing failed firms should be based on economics, not
revenge,” The Economist, 15 December 2001.
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In this setting, this paper examines whether:
(1) a TDR is economically beneficial to debtor
firms from the point of view of several val-
uation theories; (2) TDR related information
releases and outcomes have information con-
tent; and (3) the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board’s (FASB) assessment of the value
relevance of a TDR is congruent with that
of the market participants. Hence, this is an
interdisciplinary study which first presents some
theoretical and empirical evidence on the infor-
mativeness and beneficial economic consequences
of TDR and then attempts to link these
financial economics results to accounting pol-
icy issues related to the reporting of a debt
restructuring transaction in the debtor’s financial
statements (F/S).
SFAS No. 15, Accounting by Debtors and
Creditors for Troubled Debt Restructurings
(FASB, 1977), defines TDR as a concession given
by creditors to financially distressed debtors in
the form of a (1) “modification” of the terms
of the loan such as a reduction in accrued
interest, principal, nominal interest rate, or an
extension of the maturity date, all of which
reduce the present value (PV) of the outstanding
debt; (2) “full settlement” of the loan through
an exchange of assets or equity interest with
a lower fair market value than the carrying
value of the outstanding debt; (3) a combina-
tion of (1) and (2). It encompasses the restruc-
turing of both private and public debt. In
all three types of TDR, PV of cash outflows
are improved, debt that has reached subopti-
mal levels is reduced, and an economic gain is
involved, all of which should improve the risk-
iness and financial flexibility of the borrower,
and hence reduce its probability of bankruptcy
[see Hamer (1985) and Beneish and Press (1995)
for some preliminary evidence]. While these
beneficial outcomes are recognized in the F/S
in full settlements, they are not recognized in
most modification-type TDRs in accordance with
SFAS No. 15 (1977).
The economics of the TDR transaction, the
conceptual framework of the FASB, time value
of money and opportunity cost concepts, sub-
sequent FASB promulgations that require the
use of present value (PV) methods and fair val-
ues, and the PV-based measurements project
added to the Board’s agenda on October 1998,
suggest that the debt should be written down
to its post-restructuring PV and the related
gain recognized in the books in all types of
TDR. Although the promulgation of the SFAS
No. 114 has changed the lenders’ accounting
for “modifications” in 1993 in accordance with
the new PV rules for impaired loans, debtors’
accounting is still covered by the long criti-
cized SFAS No. 15. This inconsistency and the-
oretical flaw in the SFAS No.15, the research
on recognition versus disclosure issues (see, e.g.
Bernard and Schipper, 1994; Imhoff et al., 1995;
Johnson, 1992), the recent preoccupation of
researchers, the SEC, and the FASB with “qual-
ity” accounting standards (Levitt, 1998), and
the user focus to standard setting (Gregory
and Young, 1998) motivate the policy issues
discussed here.
In this study, several firm valuation theo-
ries are first invoked to form testable predic-
tions about the beneficial consequences of the
announcement and consummation of a TDR.
Second, the market reaction results of the few
prior studies on TDR (sub)samples are reviewed
to assess the information content and net benefits
of private workouts. I also provide new evidence
on excess returns over the extensive restructuring
interval to uncover a possible underreaction due
to the uncertainty inherent in TDR announce-
ments. The market response conditional upon
subsequent consummation and survival is also
measured to further examine the net benefits
of a TDR and test the ability of the mar-
ket to predict the success of a TDR attempt.
Third, the market reaction to announcements
of recognized “full-settlements” and “modifica-
tions” that mostly go unrecognized is com-
pared, for the first time in the literature, to
evaluate the consistency of the FASB’s binary
classification and recognition criteria with the
market participants’ assessments. Finally, an
accounting valuation model based on Ohlson
(1995) is used, for the first time on a sam-
ple of TDR firms, to test the value relevance
of net income (NI) versus book value of equity
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(BE) and their “recognized restructuring gain”
and “disclosed amount of restructured debt”
components.
The theoretical and empirical evidence pre-
sented suggests that private workouts have ben-
eficial consequences for debtors. The valuation
theories considered predict an increase in share-
holder wealth as a result of the announcement
and/or consummation of a TDR. The findings of
this and prior studies confirm that, on average,
positive announcement and post-announcement
excess returns accrue to the shareholders, espe-
cially if the restructuring is consummated and
the firm survives in the long run. I further find
that the positive abnormal returns to modifica-
tion type restructurings are at least as strong as
those of full settlements. Finally, although the
value relevance of reported bottom lines improve
over the restructuring interval, book values are
consistently capitalized more than reported NI—
a result consistent with prior research on value
relevance of accounting bottom lines in loss firms
(see, e.g. Barth et al., 1998; Collins et al., 1997,
1999; Hayn, 1995). Moreover, the coefficient esti-
mate for the recognized restructuring gain is
insignificant while that of the disclosed $ amount
of restructured debt seems to be capitalized.
Overall, the results indicate that the market
participants’ and the FASB’s assessment of the
value relevance of the two types of TDR are not
congruent.
The next section discusses the predictions
of extant valuation models, presents a critique
of the SFAS No. 15, and motivates the study.
In Section 3, the data requirements and the
sample characteristics are described. Section 4
reviews prior market based evidence and presents
new evidence that positive excess returns con-
tinue after the announcement, and higher excess
returns accrue to consummated restructurings
and to subsequent survivors. Finally, market
reaction tests reveal evidence on the informative-
ness of both modifications and full settlements.
In Section 5, an EBO model is employed to test
the association of the reported income and book
values with market values of the TDR firms. The
last section summarizes the study and discusses
its policy implications.
2. Theoretical Underpinnings
and the Motivation
2.1. Valuation theories and the
hypotheses
Extant valuation theories may be invoked to
predict the valuation effects of a TDR. Prior
research has only used the option-pricing model
to predict the effect of a TDR on the value of
equity (Aksu, 2001). Using a comparative stat-
ics analysis, the paper notes that common types
of restructurings, such as exchange of debt with
equity, debt forgiveness, extension of maturity
dates, and reduction in coupon rate will increase
the value of equity at the expense of lenders. This
is consistent with the observed deviations from
absolute priority rule in favor of equity, observed
in both informal and legal restructurings (see,
e.g. Eraslan, 2002; Franks and Torous, 1994).
In this paper, the effect of a TDR on the vari-
ables of financial valuation models based on cash
flows, earnings, and leverage are discussed since
the consummation of a TDR is expected to have
a direct effect on these fundamental variables.
The optimal financial leverage model posits
that the unique optimal level of leverage is
reached when the marginal decrease in firm value
due to increased risk of bankruptcy just offsets
the tax advantage of deductibility of interest.
Accordingly, if a TDR firm’s leverage is above
(below) the optimum level, TDR will increase
(decrease) firm value. Since TDR firms are heav-
ily in debt, their probability of bankruptcy must
already be quite high. At such high levels of
debt, the probability of a firm’s survival also
decreases, making the realization of tax savings
uncertain. Since a TDR reduces the PV of debt,
it is expected to improve the liquidity/solvency
ratios, reduce the probability of and enhance
firm value.
Another uncontested theory of finance
explains equity value in terms of the PV of future
dividends, often proxied by expected future cash
flows or earnings. If an event has implications
for future cash flows to the firm, the investors
will revise their expectations upon its announce-
ment, leading to a change in security prices. In
debt restructurings, ceteris paribus, there is a
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reduction in the PV of the future cash payments
necessary to retire the debt and a concomitant
gain, which are expected to favorably affect the
investors’ assessments of the amount, timing, and
uncertainty of the returns to them. The capital
market’s expectation as to the content and tim-
ing of the announcement also affects prices. The
larger the extent of uncertainty, the greater is the
revision in prices. Indeed, one would expect TDR
to be an unexpected event and it must be hard
for the market participants to predict the proba-
bility of its initiation and success. First, there are
no successful TDR prediction models as there are
for bankruptcies, mergers, or earnings. Second,
apart from voluntary news releases by the debtor
or creditor, there are no disclosure requirements
until the transaction is consummated. Further-
more, insider information/trading is less likely,
since the consent of creditors is also essential for
the initiation and consummation of the TDR, its
type, and amount. Accordingly, a positive mar-
ket response to a TDR announcement is hypoth-
esized here due to: (1) the perceived cash-flow
revaluation implications of its benefits in excess
of its costs; and (2) the surprise nature of the
announcement causing an unpredicted favorable
change in expectations after the prolonged period
of financial distress.
In an efficient market, these expected
future benefits should be fully and unbias-
edly impounded in prices upon the initial TDR
announcement. Hence, it is expected that there
will not be any post-announcement drift and the
announcement excess returns would be higher
for restructuring attempts that are consummated
and successful in saving the firm. However, due to
the aforementioned inherent uncertainty involved
in estimating the timing and content of the
announcement and the probability of consum-
mation and survival, I expect an under- or
overreaction in prices. Furthermore, the negoti-
ations involve an extensive period of time dur-
ing which the market may respond to new
announcements and events engendered by the
restructuring process, such as increased moni-
toring, value increasing spin-offs or lay-offs, or
other revitalizing effects of financial distress.
Hence, excess returns are hypothesized in the
post-announcement window as well, especially
for subsequently consummated and successful
restructurings.
Assuming the clean surplus relation, Ohlson
(1991, 1995) and Ohlson and Feltham (1995)
replace the future dividends in the basic valua-
tion model and model firm value as a function
of current book value, PV of expected excess
earnings over and above what the firm would
normally earn on its current book value, and
other orthogonal value-relevant nonaccounting
information. In this formulation, one may con-
sider TDR as a value-relevant financial event
that is to impact the F/S and hence price
through future abnormal earnings. In an empir-
ical application, Ohlson and Penman (1992)
use disaggregated income statement and balance
sheet data as explanatory variables to explain
returns. As expected, they consistently find that
the regressor expenses, liabilities, and preferred
stock have significant negative while assets and
gains, including other and extraordinary gains,
have positive coefficient estimates. Accordingly,
I hypothesize that the recognized restructuring
gain and the reduction in the liability should have
a positive effect on firm value. Furthermore, to
the extent these effects are not fully and unbias-
edly recognized in a timely fashion in the F/S,
a reduction in the value relevance of the F/S
bottom-lines is hypothesized.
2.2. A critique of SFAS No. 15 and
link to the value-relevance
hypotheses
SFAS No. 15 was promulgated immediately after
the recession of 1974–1975. The Board’s 1976
Discussion Memorandum led to considerable lob-
bying activity, and panic in the banking indus-
try. It was feared that the suggested use of PV
or fair values to value the restructured debt
could distort the earnings of banks and the way
they extend credit. Finally, in 1977, as a result
of lobbying by financial institutions, the Board
issued a much softer statement and this standard
became one of the classic examples of the politi-
cal nature of accounting standard setting in the
United States SFAS No. 15, which governed both
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the debtors’ and creditors’ accounting for TDR,
was flawed in terms of the recognition and mea-
surement of the debtors’ (creditors’) gain (loss)
in modification type TDR. Since SFAS No. 114
corrected the creditors’ accounting in 1993, we
consider only the debtors’ side in this paper.
According to SFAS No. 15, in full-settlements
of the troubled debt at less than the carrying
amount, the difference between the fair value
of assets transferred or equity granted to the
creditor and the pre-restructuring carrying value
of the payable is appropriately recorded as a
gain on restructuring and the debt is reduced
to its post-restructuring PV or fair value. How-
ever, when the terms of a loan are modified,
the debtor recognizes a restructuring gain and
reduces the payable only if its current carry-
ing value is higher than the total, undiscounted
cash payments under the new terms. Due to
this benchmark that ignores time value of money
and opportunity cost concepts, most debtors do
not recognize a restructuring gain (Beresford and
Neary, 1977).
In a 1998 commentary, Arthur Levitt
of the SEC emphasized the importance of
“high quality” accounting standards in build-
ing investor confidence and lowering the cost of
capital. All comments to his plea, by preparers,
academicians, practitioners, and standard setters
mention (1) consistency with the FASB’s Con-
ceptual Framework, other standards, and aca-
demic research findings; (2) ability to depict the
economic substance of a transaction; (3) applica-
tion of concept based standards; (4) greater user
relevance; and (5) furthering international har-
monization, as the most important attributes of
high quality accounting standards. SFAS No. 15
violates most of these desirable attributes. First
of all, SFAS No. 15 is inconsistent with prior
statements such as APB Opinion No. 21 (1971)
on interest imputation on non-interest bearing
notes, APB Opinion No. 26 (1972) and SFAS
No. 4 (1975), on early extinguishment of debt, all
of which advocate reporting and extinguishing
long-term liabilities at their PVs or fair values.
The statement is also inconsistent with sub-
sequent pronouncements such as SFAS No. 76
(1983) on in-substance defeasance of debt, and,
more significantly, SFAS No. 114 (1993), which
corrected the creditors’ accounting for impair-
ment of loans following the collapse of the savings
and loans industry. The creditors now appropri-
ately use the market value of the loan or dis-
counting of the expected future cash flows under
the new terms in the calculation of the credi-
tor’s loss. Given the similar economic substance
of the two types of TDRs and the fact that
the debtor is the beneficiary in this zero-sum
game, a more consistent and theoretically correct
accounting for modifications would have been to
reduce the carrying value of the payable to the
PV of the now smaller or deferred cash out-
flows under the new terms, using an effective
interest rate.
On the other hand, given semi-strong-form
market efficiency, there should be no difference
in the informativeness of recognized versus dis-
closed information. Regulators and academicians
believe that market participants value substance
over form, and where the information is pre-
sented should not matter. Nevertheless, there
is some empirical evidence that presentation in
F/S does matter, depending on who the users
are and how naively they interpret footnote
disclosure (Amir and Ziv, 1997; Imhoff et al.,
1993, 1995). For example, Bernard and Schipper
(1994) find that while managers react to recog-
nition of the fair value of stock options as
an expense, they do not object to its disclo-
sure in the footnotes. They argue that some
stakeholders may view footnote disclosure as
being less reliable and assign more importance
to recognized F/S numbers, and this will man-
ifest itself in greater value relevance. Johnson
(1992) notes that academic research could aid
in identifying how users process disclosures and
whether they are appropriate substitutes for
recognition. Hence, further research on the eco-
nomic consequences of a restructuring transac-
tion, how it affects the valuation multiples of
earnings and book values, and the value rel-
evance of disclosed versus recognized amounts
under the current GAAP is useful, to perhaps
motivate the FASB to consider the debtors’ side
as well or to rationalize their long silence on
the issue.
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3. Data, Sample Selection, and
Sample Description
This study uses the same final sample of
86 specifically isolated TDR firms as Aksu
(2001). The initial sample of 249 firms, which
have announced their first-time serious intent
to restructure their troubled debt within the
1973–1988 sample period, are identified from the
subject volumes of the Wall Street Journal Index
(WSJI) and on-line Text-Search Services of the
Dow Jones News/Retrieval (DJNR), searched
for the years 1973–1988 and 1979–1988, respec-
tively. This sample period of 15 years is chosen
to include the two prominent recessionary peri-
ods of the 1970s and 1980s but to also mitigate
structural changes in excess returns and in the
nature of financial crises, likely to be encoun-
tered when a longer period is used. Furthermore,
this is approximately the same period used in
prior studies and thus provides a more meaning-
ful comparison with their market reaction results
since none of them found an overall positive mar-
ket response to a TDR announcement, largely
stemming from their different objectives and
the resultant different designs and (sub)samples.
Finally, the effect of the promulgation and the
mandated accounting method is most likely to
be observed in this period that encompasses
the promulgation of the SFAS No. 15. The
final sample is obtained using the following
criteria:
(i) The TDR firms must not have filed
for bankruptcy either before or within
6 months after the TDR announcement
since bankruptcy could confound their
unique profiles or the special effect of debt
restructuring.
(ii) Sample firms must have had their TDR
announced in the WSJ or other DJNR news
media. A WSJI search was carried out to
make sure the sample firms were in financial
distress and that there were no confounding
events within 1 week of the announcement.
(iii) Sample firms must be included in S&P’s
COMPUSTAT tapes and in the CRSP tape
of the University of Chicago.2
(iv) Firms with missing return data on the event
day t, day t−1, and day t+1 are eliminated.
(v) Firms with no descriptive information on
their TDR attempts, obtained from WSJI,
the WSJ articles, the public debt covenants
provided in Moody’s manuals, and debt
related footnotes in the F/S, are also
eliminated.
Table 1, Panel A contains the breakdown
of the sample by the year of the initial TDR
announcement. Not surprisingly, the commence-
ment of most restructurings (48.8%) is clustered
in the years 1974–1976 and 1983–1985 that fol-
low the recessionary periods of the 1970s and
1980s. Panel B contains the breakdown accord-
ing to the outcome of financial distress. For 26
firms that filed under Chapter 11 or that were
liquidated within 5 years, the attempted TDR
is considered to have failed in saving the firm;
21 firms were either acquired, went through a
merger, a name change and/or reorganization
within 5 years. The rest of the firms (45%) con-
tinued their existence up to 5 years after their
TDR announcements. For the latter two cate-
gories, the restructuring is considered to have
been successful. Panel C depicts that 63 sam-
ple firms had a specific announcement as to the
consummation of their TDR attempts.
Table 2, Panel A depicts the types of restruc-
turings undertaken by sample firms. Since a firm
may engage in more than one type of TDR for
different categories of debt, the categories are not
mutually exclusive. Prior research has examined
return differences associated with the success of
the restructuring attempt (Gilson et al., 1990),
public versus private debt and the change in the
priority of claims offered (Brown et al., 1993),
and whether cash, debt, or equity is exchanged
with the debt (Chatterjee et al., 1995). Here,
we are interested in the taxonomy used by the
FASB. The board distinguished full settlements,
2Six firms had almost no data and 18 firms had very little data in the Compustat tapes. For these 24 firms, Moody’s
manuals were searched for the selected missing F/S variables, both to achieve respectable sample sizes and to attenuate
the survivorship bias in the Compustat database (Kothari et al., 1992).
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Table 1. The breakdown of 86 debt restructurings by years and outcomes.
Years No. of firms Years No. of firms
Panel A: Breakdown of the initial TDR attempt by years
1973 3 1981 7
1974 4 1982 4
1975 7 1983 5
1976 10 1984 7
1977 0 1985 9
1978 5 1986 4
1979 3 1987 7
1980 7 1988 4
Total 86
Outcome No. of TDR firms %
Panel B: Breakdown by outcome of financial distress
Liquidated within 2 years 3a 4
Files Chapter 11 (6 months to 1 year of TDR) 13a 13
Files Chapter 11 (1–2 years of TDR) 3a 4
Files Chapter 11 (2–5 years of TDR) 7a 8
Merger/acquisition within 5 years 15 19
Name change/reorganization within 5 years 6 7
Continues to exist after 5 years 39 45
Total 86 100
Outcome No. of TDR firms %
Panel C: Breakdown by outcome of the restructuring attempt
Consummation announcement 63 73
Announcement of failure of TDR attempt 15b 17.5
No information on consummation 8 9.5
Total 86 100
The sample is composed of financially distressed firms that have announced their first-
time serious intent to restructure their debt during the 1973–1988 period. The sample
firms and the outcome of their financial distress and TDR attempts are identified from
the subject volumes of the WSJI and on-line Text-Search Services of DJNR.
aThese 26 firms (30.23%) have subsequently filed for bankruptcy and their TDR
attempt is considered to have failed in helping them recover from financial distress.
bFor these 15 firms that announced a bankruptcy filing (11 firms) or suspension of
talks (two firms), or negotiations still continuing after day +330 (two firms), TDR is
considered unconsummated.
modification of the loan terms, and a combi-
nation of these types and mandated different
accounting treatments for them. To evaluate the
congruence between the market’s and the FASB’s
assessment, I test the null hypothesis that the
market reaction to the announcement of full-
settlements and modifications are indeed differ-
ent. The percentage of firm-announcements that
fall into these three categories are 30%, 49%,
and 21%, respectively, as depicted in Panel B.
Panel C shows that the total (mean) dollar
amount of debt restructured by the 86 sample
firms is $21.138 billion ($258.99 million). The
mean ratio of “debt restructured/total liabili-
ties” is 0.47 and the mean $ amount of the debt
restructured is 102% of the mean stockholders
equity as of year t− 1, reflecting the materiality
of the transaction. Unlike most other financial
events, the restructuring interval is a long period
of time over which negotiations take place. The
mean number of days from the initial announce-
ment, to either the WSJ announcement of the
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Table 2. The types, amount, and duration of debt restructurings (N = 86).
General typesa % Of firms that restructure any
debt according to given type
Panel A
1. Maturity of principal/interest extended 68%
2. Interest rate reduced 16%
3. Debt/interestb exchanged with equityc 55%
4. Debt/interestb exchanged with new debt 41%
5. Debt canceled through transfer of assets 38%
Panel B: The FASB’s classification of types of TDR
1. Full-settlements 30%
2. Modification of terms 49%
3. Both 21%
Amount and duration of TDR n Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Panel C
1. Amount ($) of debt restructured (in millions) 82 258.99 73.4 1 4100
2. Debt restructured/Total debtt−1 82 0.47 0.48 0.007 1.23
3. Restructuring intervald (in calendar days) 65 201 151 26 640
The sample is composed of financially distressed firms that have announced their first-time serious
intent to restructure their debt during the 1973–1988 period. The sample firms and the length of the
restructuring interval are identified from the subject volumes of the WSJI and on-line Text-Search
Services of DJNR. The TDR types and the $ amount are obtained from the DJNR and WSJ articles
themselves, the public debt covenants provided in Moody’s manuals, and debt related footnotes in
the F/S of sample firms.
aDebt forgiveness is included in types 3, 4, and 5 in this classification since in a TDR, the fair value
of the equity or the assets exchanged must be less than the carrying value of the debt canceled and
the new debt has more favorable terms (including reduced principal, future, or accrued interest) than
the replaced one.
bInterest includes both accrued and future payments of interest.
cIncludes distributions of C/S, P/S, warrants, and convertible debt, and the option to make future
payments of interest and principal either in cash or in equity securities of the TDR firm.
dTime from initial TDR announcement until either the consummation of TDR or the last WSJ
reference to the previously announced TDR.
consummation or the last WSJ reference to a pre-
viously announced TDR is 201 days.
4. Prior Market-Based Evidence,
New Empirical Tests, and
Policy Implications
In this section, I address the question of whether
the economic benefits predicted by the val-
uation theories are fully and instantaneously
impounded in prices upon the initial announce-
ment of a TDR attempt by first reviewing
prior market based research and then conduct-
ing new market reaction tests to determine
whether the market participants (1) underre-
act at the time of the announcement; (2) can
distinguish subsequent survivors and consum-
mated restructurings, and (3) react differently to
full-settlements and modifications.
4.1. Prior market based research
Prior research has found that the usual neg-
ative reaction to financial distress announce-
ments is smaller for covenant violations (Beneish
and Press, 1995), defaults, and successful pri-
vate workouts (Gilson et al., 1990) than the reac-
tion to unsuccessful restructurings that end in a
Chapter 11 (Gilson et al., 1990) and to bankrupt-
cies (Clark and Weinstein, 1983). Gilson et al.
(1990) report still negative but insignificant
CAR(−1.0) of −1.6% to −3% to successful
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TDR announcements, significantly higher than
those of defaults and restructurings that end
in bankruptcy within a year of the announce-
ment. Brown et al. (1993) and Chatterjee et al.
(1995) find positive announcement excess returns
in about half of their subsamples of restructur-
ing firms — the former, when public bondhold-
ers are offered senior claims and banks are offered
junior claims, and the latter, in only tender offers
of public debt. Finally, Aintablian and Roberts
(1999) find a significant CAR(−1.0) of 3.45 %
for a small sample of 18 bank loan restructurings
in an overall sample of 137 bank loan announce-
ments. Since the objectives and thus designs and
sample selection criteria in these studies were dif-
ferent, they have used nonhomogeneous informa-
tion releases and either too broad (sub)samples
composed of firms in various stages of financial
distress or too narrow or small TDR samples, all
of which resulted in findings that are difficult to
interpret in terms of the overall market reaction
to a TDR announcement.3 As a result, none of
them find a positive average market reaction to
a TDR announcement. Aksu (2001), for the first
time, finds a significant positive overall market
reaction to a specifically isolated, first-time TDR
attempt, significantly different than the market
response to a matched sample.
As shown in Panel A of Table 3, adapted
from Aksu (2001), which examines the effect
of size, book-to-market ratio, and prior distress
information on excess returns to TDR firms,
shareholders have lost approximately 87% value
compared to holding an investment in the mar-
ket portfolio over a 300-day preannouncement
period. This is consistent with Gilson et al.’s
(1990) −134.% CMAR over the 3 years prior
to successful TDR announcements. Panel B of
Table 3. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for selected windows (N = 86).a
Days relative to event (Day 0) CAR t-Value p-Value
A. Pre-announcement period
−340 to −41 −0.866 −9.419b 0.00
−40 to −2 −0.020 −0.618 0.54
B. Event window
−1 to +1 0.023 2.492 0.01
−3 to 0 0.033 3.194 0.00
−1 to 0 0.027 3.630 0.00
Day 0 0.022 4.169 0.00
C. Postannouncement event window
+1 to +40 0.061 1.831 0.07
D. Restructuring interval
−1 to 330 0.66 6.814 0.00
Firm-specific daily excess return (AR) is calculated as the difference between the actual
daily return and the market- and risk-adjusted expected return obtained from the
one-factor market model, estimated over a 300-day estimation period ending on day −40.
The return on the market portfolio is measured as the CRSP equally weighted index. The
significance of the average cumulative excess returns (CAR), calculated by summing the
daily (AR), is measured using the Brown and Warner (1985) portfolio test statistic. All
tests are two-sided.
aPanels A, B, and C of the table are adapted from Aksu (2001), Table 4.
bThe significance of the market adjusted excess returns for the 300 trading days prior to
the start (day −41) of the event window is measured by the test statistic employed in
Dennis and McConnell (1986).
3For example, Gilson et al. (1990) and Gilson (1990) examine the poorest performing stocks in CRSP, which have
announced a debt service default, out-of-court restructuring, or bankruptcy within a year of the restructuring attempt.
This heterogeneity makes it difficult to assess whether the results are driven by the firms’ TDR, prior default, subsequent
bankruptcy, or the fact that they have poor earnings prospects.
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Table 3 shows that the CAR(−1, 0) and day-0
average excess returns are 2.7% and 2.2%, respec-
tively, both significant at α = 0.00 indicat-
ing that the announcement has information
content and a private workout is a value increas-
ing alternative in relieving financial distress.4
The CAR(1, 40) of 6.1% reported in Panel C
is also significant at α = 0.07, indicating that
excess returns continue after the announcement.
4.2. Method of analysis and
restructuring interval
excess returns
Since subsequent bankruptcy or consummation
and the concurrent F/S recognition of a con-
summated TDR may affect the revaluation
process, the post-announcement restructuring
interval CAR is also of interest in this study.
Standard event study methodologies (Brown
and Warner, 1985) are used to measure and
evaluate the excess returns in relevant event
windows and partitions of the sample. Daily
excess returns (AR) are calculated using the
one-factor market model whose parameters are
estimated over a 300-trading day estimation
period, days (−340,−41). The return on the mar-
ket portfolio is measured as the CRSP equally
weighted index. The cumulative average market
and risk-adjusted excess returns (CAR), calcu-
lated by summing daily average excess returns
(AR), are evaluated over various event win-
dows around the announcement day (day 0).
Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR)
are used to calculate the pre-announcement
excess returns. The significance of the CAR is
tested using the standard portfolio (T1) and
the standardized (T2) test statistic in Brown
and Warner (1985) with qualitatively the same
results.
The long-window restructuring interval until
the consummation date or the date of the last
WSJ reference to a previously announced TDR
presented in Panel D of Table 4 is 66%, signifi-
cantly different from 0 at α = 0.00. Both the long
and shorter window postannouncement results
are not consistent with an instantaneous and full
adjustment of prices to publicly available infor-
mation and support the underreaction hypothe-
sis. Gilson et al. (1990), the only other study that
has examined the restructuring-interval returns,
have also found excess returns of 41% for their
subsample of successful restructurings. Unless
the well-known methodological problems in the
calculation of long-term excess returns have led
to misspecification errors (see, e.g. Kothari and
Warner, 1997), it is unlikely that the results
are sample-specific.Overall, the market reaction
results support the informativeness and the per-
ceived economic benefits of a TDR. They fur-
ther suggest that a more consistent recognition
of TDR that better reflects the economic sub-
stance of the transaction could have captured
the positive change in the market’s expectations
better.5 Alternatively, the results indicate that
market participants rationally assess the bene-
fits as predicted by valuation models, in spite of
the incomplete and lagging information in F/S.
Hence, the disclosure versus recognition debate
may be irrelevant.
4In comparison, consider the CAR(−1, 1) of −47% upon a bankruptcy announcement (Clark and Weinstein, 1983),
the unadjusted return of −3.8% for the (−1, 0) window around financial distress news items announced in the WSJI
(Thompson et al., 1987), and the CAR(−1, 0) of −6.3% for initial and subsequent announcements of defaults and
restructurings that end up in bankruptcy (Gilson et al., 1990).
5However, there is the caveat that the market reaction reflects not only the reduction in the PV of future payments, but
also the improved viability of the company and the surprise nature of this signal. While the former can be incorporated
into the accounting system, the latter cannot be. I am indebted to the two anonymous reviewers who brought this
constraint to my attention. This lack of a one-to-one correspondence between the announcement period excess returns
and the recognizable reduction in the PV of debt, both in terms of timing and content, is likely to overstate the role
of the debt reduction/delay on the excess returns. All the same, the improved prospects will be reflected in the excess
returns, the left-hand side of the valuation equation. To the extent the reduction in the PV of debt and the related gain
are not reflected in the accounting bottom lines on the right-hand side, a lower explanatory power and value relevance
is predicted for accounting numbers.
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Table 4. Cross-sectional return differences related to TDR outcomes.
Test window Consummationb Bankruptcyc
Unconsummated Consummated Difference Bankrupt Nonbankrupt Difference
N = 15 N = 63 N = 25 N = 61
−40 to −2 −0.097 −0.021 −8.06 −0.039 −0.011 −0.608
(0.12) (0.54) (0.00) (0.22) (0.76) (0.55)
−1, 0 0.061 0.025 16.23 0.035 0.023 2.498
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0 0.034 0.021 8.15 0.025 0.021 1.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32)
+1 to +40 −0.092 0.087 −15.99 0.079 0.053 2.868
(0.15) (0.03) (0.00) (0.20) (0.16) (0.01)
+1 to Consum.d −0.287 0.218 −22.75 0.209 0.327 −4.535
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm-specific daily excess return (AR) is calculated as the difference between the actual daily return and the market-
and risk-adjusted expected return obtained from the one-factor market model, estimated over a 300-day estimation period
ending on day −40. The return on the market portfolio is measured as the CRSP equally weighted index. The significance
of the average cumulative excess returns (CAR), calculated by summing the daily (AR), is measured using the Brown and
Warner (1985) portfolio test statistics. All tests are two-sided. The CARs and the corresponding (p-values) are presented
in the table. The “Difference” columns contain the t-values (p-values) for the significance of the difference in mean excess
returns between each of the two subsamples of TDR firms.a
aThe t-tests for the equality of means of two populations are conducted assuming independent samples and small sample
sizes.
bA firm is included in the consummated subsample if there is a definite WSJ announcement as to a final agreement or
consummation or completion of TDR. Eight firms are left out of both subsamples because it was impossible to determine
the consummation status from the data sources.
cA firm is included in the bankrupt subsample if it has filed under Chapter 11 within 5 years of the TDR announcement
date. Hence, bankrupt subsample may include firms whose TDRs were previously consummated.
dThe latest consummation date by which at least three not yet consummated TDR firms remain in the smaller size sub-
sample. The return observations of firms with earlier consummation dates are considered as missing observations. The last
day of the long test window is +166 days for the unconsummated and consummated subsamples, and +196 days for the
bankrupt and nonbankrupt subsamples.
4.3. Return differences related to the
outcome of the TDR attempt
In this section, the abnormal returns to consum-
mated versus unconsummated restructurings, as
well as to firms that subsequently survive ver-
sus those that go bankrupt within 6 months of
their TDR announcements are evaluated. While
63 sample firms have unambiguous announce-
ments as to the consummation, or completion
of their TDR, for 15 companies TDR is con-
sidered unconsummated as shown in Table 1,
Panel B. Similarly, 61 firms for which there are
no bankruptcy announcements within 5 years are
considered nonbankrupt.
As depicted in Table 4, the significantly
positive day [−1, 0] reaction in both the
consummated and unconsummated (and bank-
rupt and nonbankrupt) subsamples is consistent
with the perceived net benefits of TDR and
the signaling/announcement effects. This finding
also indicates that, ex-ante, the market is not
able to differentiate between a TDR that will be
consummated (go bankrupt) and one that will
not be. However, the persistently negative (posi-
tive) post-announcement CAR in the unconsum-
mated (consummated) subsample indicates that
the market participants do differentiate between
these two outcomes, as the uncertainty in the
probability of consummation is resolved. For the
consummated subsample, a strong positive drift
is observed and the CAR(1, 40) and CAR(1, 166)
are 8.7% and 21.8% and both are significantly
higher than the postannouncement CAR for the
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unconsummated subsample.6 Similar but weaker
results obtain in the comparison of nonbankrupt
versus bankrupt TDR firms even though the
positive CAR in the 196-day postannouncement
period is again significantly higher in the non-
bankrupt sample.7
4.4. Return differences related to the
FASB’s classification of TDR
Since SFAS No. 15 requires different accounting
treatments for full-settlements and most modi-
fication type restructurings, we investigate if a
similar distinction is made in the eyes of mar-
ket participants. In other words, do investors
value the unrecognized reduction in the PV of
a restructured debt and the related gain in
modifications as they would the recognized debt
reduction and gain in full-settlements? If for-
mal recognition in F/S makes the transaction
more informative and beneficial to the debtor,
one would expect a positive reaction to full-
settlements and no reaction or at least a smaller
reaction to modifications. Table 5 reports the
average return behavior of 22 firms that have
reported an extraordinary debt restructuring
gain as a line item in their F/S upon consum-
mation of their restructuring negotiations versus
the remaining 64 firms, which have gone through
modifications and did not have to report a related
extraordinary gain. Surprisingly, CAR(−1, 0) for
the “modification” subsample is 3.3% and signifi-
cantly higher than the “recognized gain” subsam-
ple. However, both groups exhibit significantly
positive postannouncement period CAR that is
not significantly different.
The results indicate that modifications
for which no gain is recognized lead to
more significant positive announcement and
as significant postannouncement price revisions
as full-settlements. Thus, market participants’
assessment of the importance and benefits of
the two types of TDR does not support the
FASB’s different reporting requirements. A con-
sistent standard would have required recognition
of both, and in doing so better serve the inter-
pretative, predictive, and confirmatory roles of
F/S. On the other hand, the results also sug-
gest that market participants do not respond
to only the current period results (the myopic
hypothesis) or to only the reported bottom lines
of F/S (the mechanistic hypothesis). They ratio-
nally consider the economic effects of future cash
flows in their assessments. This may indicate
the unimportance of F/S information in an effi-
cient market where participants respond to more
timely information sources.
5. Value Relevance of Financial
Statement Bottom Lines
The accounting valuation tests employed here
are based on the theoretical EBO model that
explains firm value as a function of current
book value plus the PV of future residual
incomes in excess of a normal return on book
value. The theoretical model and its empir-
ical applications suggest that both reported
income and book value are priced (Collins et al.,
1997; Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson and Penman, 1992;
Penman, 1997). A second reason for our focus
on both earnings and book value is that the
restructuring transaction affects both NI (the
restructuring gain) and BE (the reduction in
the PV of the debt). Third, Collins et al.
(1999) find that the anomalous negative relation
between earnings and price in loss firms is due
to the misspecification of the valuation model
when only the earnings variable is included.
Finally, prior research has provided evidence that
6Excess returns over a longer window of 330 days can be accumulated for this larger sample. The CAR(1, 330) is mea-
sured as 69.4%, significant at α = 0.00 (not reported in the table). Since consummation unravels the uncertainty related
to the resolution of the firm’s financial distress, its announcement may have incremental information content which, due
to the uncertainty of the final creditor consent, might not have been fully impounded in prices when the TDR was first
announced. The CAR might then be significantly positive over this long window since the few days of large, positive
excess returns around the consummation day vary from stock to stock.
7The reason for the weaker results might be that only 10 of the 25 TDR firms in the bankrupt subsample file under
Chapter 11 within the 196-day postannouncement window. Also, the bankrupt sample includes some firms whose restruc-
turings were previously consummated and thus may have had positive abnormal returns.
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Table 5. Cross-sectional return differences related to FASB’s classification of TDR.
Test window Type of TDR
Extraordinary gain Modification Difference
N = 22 N = 64
−40 to −2 0.017 −0.032 8.372
(0.82) (0.36) (0.00)
−1, 0 0.009 0.033 −15.623
(0.62) (0.00) (0.00)
0 0.028 0.020 1.352
(0.02) (0.00) (0.18)
+1 to +40 0.193 0.024 4.762
(0.01) (0.25) (0.00)
+1 to Consummationa 0.499 0.433 1.094
(0.01) (0.00) (0.28)
Firm-specific daily excess return (AR) is calculated as the difference between the actual daily
return and the market- and risk-adjusted expected return obtained from the one-factor market
model, estimated over a 300-day estimation period ending on day −40. The return on the mar-
ket portfolio is measured as the CRSP equally-weighted index. The significance of the average
cumulative excess returns (CAR), calculated by summing the daily (AR), is measured using
the Brown and Warner (1985) portfolio tests. All tests are two-sided. The CARs and the corre-
sponding (p-values) are presented in the table. The “Difference” column contains the t-values
(p-values) for the significance of the difference in mean excess returns between the subsample
with a recognized restructuring gain and the subsample that engaged in modification of the
terms of the loan.b
aThe latest consummation date by which at least three not yet consummated TDR firms remain
in the smaller size subsample. The return observations of firms with earlier consummation dates
are considered as missing observations. This last day of the long test window is +274 days for
the extraordinary gain and modification subsamples.
bThe t-tests for the equality of means of two populations are conducted assuming independent
samples and small sample sizes.
the valuation role of net income versus book
value in financially distressed firms, firms with
losses, and when earnings/book value is low
(see, e.g. Barth et al., 1998; Burgstahler and
Dichev, 1997; Franzen, 2002; Penman, 1997).
The TDR sample is an inherently suitable out-
of-sample testing ground for this prior research
finding.
The empirical and theoretical evidence pre-
sented so far suggests that TDR is economically
beneficial to the shareholders of debtors and has
information content. We thus expect and find
that prices (the left-hand side of the valuation
equation) reflect this anticipated cash-flow (earn-
ings) potential. However, the current GAAP does
not allow the recognition of a properly calcu-
lated restructuring gain and the reduction in the
liability in most modification type restructur-
ings. To the extent that current reported book
values and earnings (the right-hand side) are
not informative of such anticipated earnings, we
expect the valuation coefficients of NI and BE to
be lower and even insignificant. Furthermore, we
hypothesize that a TDR firm’s BE is more value
relevant than its NI in line with prior research on
loss firms.
Several model specifications are used and all
variables are deflated by the number of shares
outstanding at fiscal year end to control for size
differences. First, market value per share, P , is
regressed on F/S bottom lines, book-equity per
share (BEPS) and earnings per share (EPS). EPS
is then partitioned to include an EPS dummy for
negative earnings and BEPS is partitioned into
assets (TA) and liabilities (TL) components, as
the latter is directly affected by the TDR transac-
tion. The model specifications estimated for the
3 years surrounding the announcement year (t),
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are the following:
Pit = β0t + β1t BEPSit + β2t EPSit + εit (1)
Pit = β0t + β1tTAit + β2tTLit + β3t EPSit
+β4t EPSdummyit + εit (2)
where, i and t are the firm and year subscripts,
respectively. In all specifications, a random walk
process is assumed for residual income, as in
many other empirical adaptations of the model,
and hence current year income is used as a proxy
for the PV of future residual incomes.8
As observed in Table 6, whether it is used
alone or with EPS, BEPS always has a signifi-
cant coefficient estimate and results in a better-
specified model when it is included in the model.
However, the coefficient estimate for EPS is
positive and significant only in year (t). The coef-
ficient estimate of the EPSdummy is always sig-
nificant and has the expected negative sign. The
disaggregated components of book value, TA and
TL, are significant and have the correct signs.
These results consistently hold in all 3 years.
While the explanatory power of the model with
EPS as the only regressor deteriorates over the
3 years, it improves for the models that include
BEPS, or TA and TL per share. It is concluded
that book value and its components are more
value relevant than income in TDR firms. EPS
has very low or no value relevance either due
to the nonrecognition and/or incorrect measure-
ment of the restructuring gain and/or due to its
general lack of value relevance in financially dis-
tressed firms.
Next, TL and EPS are partitioned to directly
test the incremental value relevance of the $
amount of debt restructured (our proxy for the
reduction in the PV of the pre-restructuring
debt), disclosed in the footnotes, and the restruc-
turing gain, recognized in the financial state-
ments. I estimate the following two equations:
Pit = β0t + β1t TAit + β2t(TL−AR)it
+β3t ARit + β4t EPSit
+β5t EPSdummyit + εit (3)
Pit = β0t + β1t BEPSit + β2t EPSBRGit
+β3t RGit + β4t RGit
×EPSBRGdummyit + εit (4)
Table 6. Value relevance of reported net income (NI) and book value of equity (BE) during the restructuring
interval.
Regressors Year = (t− 1) Year = (t)a Year = (t+ 1)
Coefficient estimates Coefficient estimates Coefficient estimates
(p-Value) R2 (p-Value) R2 (p-Value) R2
BE 0.37 0.44 0.70
(0.00) 0.34 (0.00) 0.45 (0.00) 0.53
NI NIdummyb 0.02 −11.67 0.35 −3.36 0.13 −7.15
(0.93) (0.00) 0.26 (0.00) (0.15) 0.23 (0.45) (0.03) 0.13
BE NI 0.29 −0.06 −6.55 0.38 0.14 −1.82 0.68 −0.02 −1.76
Nidummy (0.00) (0.74) (0.01) 0.42 (0.00) (0.17) (0.36) 0.49 (0.00) (0.92) (0.49) 0.54
TA TL NI 0.26 −0.24 0.05 −8.06 0.27 −0.25 0.23 −1.38 0.59 −0.54 0.19 −2.54
Nidummy (0.00) (0.03) (0.84) (0.01) 0.39 (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.50) 0.44 (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.31) 0.53
The full model is MVEit = βBt + β1t TAit + β2tTLit + β3tNIit + β4tNIdummyit + εit. where, i and t are the firm
and year subscripts, respectively; MVE = Market value of equity; TA = Total assets; TL = Total liabilities; NI = Net
income. All variables are deflated by the number of common stock shares outstanding at each fiscal year end so that
the values are all per share figures.
aYear t is the initial announcement year.
bNIdummy is for negative earnings.
8This is an important limitation of the study since the sample is composed of financially distressed firms. On the one
hand, the sustainability of the level of earnings in these firms is suspect. On the other hand, the market’s expectations
about their prospects are high, as evidenced by the positive excess returns. To the extent that these effects cancel each
other, we do not expect the proxy for unexpected NI to be much biased.
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where, AR is the $ amount of debt restruc-
tured per share disclosed in year (t) footnotes of
77 sample firms; (TL-AR) stand for the remain-
ing liabilities of the firm, RG is the extraordi-
nary restructuring gain reported in the income
statement of 26 sample firms, either in period (t)
or (t + 1), EPSBRG is the earnings before the
restructuring gain, RG×EPSBRGdummy is the
interaction term, and all other variables are as
defined earlier.
Panel A, Table 7 indicates that model (3)
is well specified, with significant coefficient esti-
mates that have the correct signs for all variables
with the exception of EPS and has the high-
est R2 (63%) among all the specifications tested.
Under the caveat that R2 is not a safe metric to
make inferences on value relevance, the difference
between the R2 of regressions estimated in (2)
and (3) can be attributed to the incremental
explanatory power of the disclosed amount of
debt restructured (63% − 44% = 19%).
Estimated coefficients and their significance
for model (4) are reported in Panel B where
all variables are measured in year (t) or (t + 1)
depending on when the restructuring gain is rec-
ognized. The interaction term is used to deter-
mine if the restructuring gain would be more
value relevant for firms reporting a loss before
their RG. While one would normally expect
significant and positive coefficient estimates for
both of the income partitions, some prior studies
suggest that permanent and transitory compo-
nents of earnings may have different information
contents. For example, Burgstahler et al. (1999)
find that prices do not fully reflect the time-
series implications of negative special items in
earnings. Similarly, the investors may perceive
the recognized RG to be transitory and that it
garbles the permanent component of earnings.
Our results are consistent with this body of liter-
ature. Contrary to initial expectations, all coef-
ficient estimates, except that of BE, turn out to
Table 7. Value relevance of the recognized restructuring gain (RG) and the disclosed amount of
debt restructured (AR).
Regressor TA TL− AR AR NI NIdummy
Panel A: Partitioned total liabilities
Estimated Regressiona,b:
MVEit = βBt + β1t TAit + β2t (TL− AR)it + β3tARit + β4tNIit + β5tNIdummyit + εit
Coef. estimate 0.020 −0.024 −0.023 −0.006 −0.162
p-Value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.071) (0.019)
R2: 0.63
Regressor BE NIBRG RG RG× NIBRGdummy
Panel B: Partitioned net income
Estimated Regressiona,b:
MVEit = βBt + β1t BEit + β2t NIBRGit + β3tRGit + β4t RGit × NIBRGdummyit + εit
Coefficient estimate 0.438 −0.064 −1.655 1.231
p-value (0.004) (0.716) (0.743) (0.807)
R2: 0.38
The basic model estimated is MVEit = βBt+β1t TAit+β2t TLit+β3tNIit+β4tNIdummyit+εit. where,
i and t are the firm and year subscripts, respectively, MVE = Market value of equity; TA = Total assets;
TL = Total liabilities; NI = Net income. In this specification, TL is further partitioned to test the value
relevance of the $ amount of debt restructured (AR) and NI is further partitioned to test the value rele-
vance of the recognized restructuring gain (RG). NIBRG dummy is used for the years in which the firms
reported a loss RG. All variables are deflated by the number of common stock shares outstanding at each
fiscal year end and hence, they are all measured as per share figures.
at = the announcement year.
bt = the announcement year or the year subsequent to that depending on the year in which the restruc-
turing gain is recognized in the financial statements of the firm.
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be insignificant. While the (insignificant) coeffi-
cient estimate of RG and income before RG have
the wrong negative sign, the (insignificant) coef-
ficient estimate of RG for firms that report a loss
before their RG is large and has the correct sign,
for the first time. There may be several explana-
tions for this unexpected result: (1) the finding
supports the previous research which finds that
NI and its components are not as value relevant
in financially distressed firms; (2) the market
views the extraordinary gain as a one-time, tran-
sitory gain; (3) due to adverse economic condi-
tions faced by these firms, investors use a higher
rate to discount their expected future cash flows,
leading to lower or insignificant earnings coeffi-
cients; (4) the measurement error in the recog-
nized gain and other components of earnings and
the unrecognized gain in modifications depress
the earnings component of the equation, which
then does not reflect the true economic conse-
quences of a TDR already reflected in prices;
(5) the small sample size for recognized gains
(n = 26) has reduced the power of the tests
employed. Only the explanations number (4) and
(5) are consistent with our original expectations.
The disclosed information on the amount of debt
restructured seems to be more value relevant
than the RG.
Finally, the change in value relevance as a
function of the promulgation of No. 15, the num-
ber of restructurings attempted, and recogni-
tion of a restructuring gain are examined, with
results reported in Table 8. Interestingly, the
overall explanatory power of the regressions has
declined (R2 decreases from 0.81 to 0.58) after
the promulgation of the SFAS No. 15, suggesting
that the market participants find the bottom
lines measured according to the new standard
less informative of prices. Next, value relevance
in the 54 TDR firms that has gone through a
single restructuring attempt is compared with
that of 27 firms with several attempts. Multiple
attempts seem to increase the value relevance of
EPS, at the expense of TA and TL components
Table 8. Value relevance of bottom lines in various other partitions of the sample.
Coefficient estimates (p-Values)
TA TL NI NIdummy R2
Before 1978a (n = 21) 0.014 −0.016 0.004 0.041 0.809
(0.000) (0.000) (0.602) (0.711)
After 1978 0.035 −0.045 −0.017 −0.266 0.580
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.021)
With RGb (n = 26) 0.374 −0.324 0.150 2.863 0.393
(0.033) (0.148) (0.569) (0.522)
Without RG 0.257 −0.229 0.258 −2.540 0.391
(0.000) (0.002) (0.017) (0.139)
Multiple TDRc (n = 27) 0.188 −0.146 0.401 5.733 0.603
(0.076) (0.276) (0.006) (0.165)
Single TDR 0.324 −0.287 0.154 −4.116 0.424
(0.000) (0.030) (0.590) (0.126)
The full model is MVEit = βBt+β1t TAit+β2t TLit+β3tNIit+β4t NIdummyit+ εit. where, i and t are
the firm and year subscripts, respectively, MVE = market value of equity; TA = total assets; TL = total
liabilities; NI = net income. All variables are deflated by the number of common stock shares outstanding
at each fiscal year end and hence, they are all measured as per share figures.
aThe regression results are for 21 (59) TDR firms that had a TDR attempt before (subsequent to) the
effective date of SFAS No. 15 in 1978.
bThe regression results are for the 26 firm-years (in years t or t+1) in which a TDR firm had an extraor-
dinary recognized restructuring gain and for 125 firm-years with no recognized restructuring gain.
cThe regression results are for year t (announcement year) values of the explanatory variables for 27 (54)
TDR firms that went through multiple (single) restructurings.
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of BPS. This might indicate that the transaction
is not perceived as a one-time, transitory item for
such firms.9 The last test indicates that for the
125 firm-years with no recognized restructuring
gain, the coefficients for both BE and NI parti-
tions are more significant compared to those for
the 26 firm-years with a reported extraordinary
gain. In summary, the promulgation of SFAS
No. 15 and the mandated method of accounting
for recognized debt restructurings have further
mitigated the role of NI.
6. Summary and Conclusion
This study first utilizes extant firm valuation
theories — dividend/earnings/cash flow and
optimal capital structure models, as well as an
EBO model of accounting valuation — to pre-
dict an increase in shareholder value as a result
of the announcement and consummation of TDR.
Second, it performs market reaction analysis
and finds significant positive postannouncement
excess returns during the extensive restructur-
ing interval and higher excess returns to subse-
quently consummated restructurings and to firms
that survive. The evidence supports the ben-
eficial economic consequences of a TDR, but
indicates that the market underreacts to the
announcement and cannot exante predict the
success of a TDR attempt.
Based on these favorable economic conse-
quences, the paper then probes into an account-
ing policy issue: the asymmetric accounting
treatment of SFAS No. 15 for the debtor
and creditor and for modification versus full-
settlement types of TDR. The paper first
argues that the statement is theoretically flawed
and does not live up to the recent impor-
tance attached to “quality” in accounting stan-
dards. Of course, the Board’s deliberations were
long before these discussions and at the time,
they may have wanted to avoid the subjec-
tive PV calculations. Furthermore, the asymmet-
ric reporting for the debtors and creditors is a
manifestation of the conservatism bias of faster
recognition of losses versus gains.10 Neverthe-
less, further market reaction tests reveal that the
response to a modification of the loan terms that
mostly go unrecognized in the F/S is at least as
significant as that of a recognized full-settlement
of the debt. Apparently, the FASB’s and the mar-
ket participants’ perceptions of the information
content and value relevance of debt restructur-
ings do not converge. Finally, an accounting val-
uation model is used to provide a link between
firm value and reported F/S numbers, measured
in line with SFAS No. 15. The findings indicate
that BE and its component “dollar amount of
debt restructured” disclosed only in the foot-
notes are value relevant while NI and its partition
“extraordinary restructuring gain” recognized in
the income statement are not. This raises the
question of whether a more economically reveal-
ing measure of the restructuring gain would have
been more value relevant.
A theoretical and empirical understanding of
the informativeness and value relevance of TDR
should be helpful in the decision-making pro-
cesses of all users of market and F/S based infor-
mation. The investors’ and creditors’ demand
for information, and F/S preparers’ and policy
makers’ supply of information may be altered
as a result of understanding the economic con-
sequences of a TDR. Given the recent preoc-
cupation of the academicians and rule making
bodies with recognition versus disclosure issues,
use of PV methods in reporting, and “quality”
of accounting standards, this research attempts
to provide input to the accounting standard set-
ting bodies’ deliberations on recognition, timing,
and measurement issues, especially as related to
TDR. The findings suggest that, a reconsider-
ation of the debtor’s side may be justified as
well. Future research should attempt to associate
a more economically revealing measure of the
reduction in the PV of the outstanding debt and
the related restructuring gain with prices to see
if they lead to a higher value relevance.
9This interpretation is contrary to Elliott and Hanna’s (1996) results where repeated, discretionary asset write-offs
further reduce the value relevance of earnings.
10I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer who, in rightful defense of the Board, brought this point to my attention.
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